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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW
OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. SUPREME COURT REVERSALS
A. United States v. Ward
In United States . Ward,' the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Ward v. Coleman.2 The Court held that fines,
imposed by the United States against owners and operators of onshore facili-
ties from which oil is discharged, in violation of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA),3 constituted a civil rather than a criminal penalty.
The Court thus concluded that a provision in the Act requiring dischargers
to report their own violations 4 did not infringe upon a discharger's constitu-
tional right to be protected from compulsory self-incrimination.
By the terms in effect at the time this case arose,5 section 31 1(b)(3) pro-
hibited the discharge of oil or hazardous substances in "harmful" quantities
into navigable waters or onto adjoining shorelines. 6 Persons in charge of a
vessel or responsible for an on-shore or off-shore facility were required to
report any such hazardous discharge to the appropriate federal agency.
7
Failure to report the discharge would subject violators to possible fine or
imprisonment.8 A "civil penalty" was imposed against the owner or opera-
tor of a facility found to be in violation of the Act. 9 In 1977, a maximum
penalty of $5,000 per violation could be assessed.' 0
In March 1975, oil escaped from a retention pit at a drilling facility
located in Oklahoma and owned by L.O. Ward Oil and Gas Operations.
The oil washed into Boggie Creek, a tributary of the Arkansas River System.
Ward cleaned up the oil spill and notified the Environmental Protection
Agency that the discharge had occurred. A more complete report was for-
warded to the Coast Guard,1 which assessed a $500 penalty against Ward.12
Ward appealed the Coast Guard's ruling, contending that the reporting
requirements of the Act violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. After the administrative appeal was denied, Ward filed suit
1. 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
2. 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) as amendedby The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, and The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-576, 96 Stat. 1566.
4. Id. § 1321(b)(5).
5. The Clean Water Act of 1977 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1978 amended § 311 of the FWPCA. The amendments, however, have no bearing on
the case.
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).
7. Id. § 1321(b)(5).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 1321(b)(6).
10. Id.
11. The Coast Guard was responsible for assessing civil penalties under § 31 l(b)(6).
12. 100 S. Ct. at 2640.
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in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the penalty. Ward's action, and a separate
action filed by the United States to collect the unpaid penalty, were consoli-
dated for trial.
13
The district court, on motion for summary judgment, rejected Ward's
constitutional claim. 14 The case was thereafter tried to a jury on the sole
issue of the occurrence and harmfulness of the discharge. The jury found
that Ward's facility did indeed spill oil in harmful quantities into navigable
waters. The district court assessed a penalty in the reduced amount of
$250.15
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the penalty provision, sec-
tion 311 (b) (6), to be criminal in nature. The appellate tribunal invalidated
the self-reporting requirement as violative of Ward's fifth amendment
rights. 16
In examining the statute, the court of appeals focused on the legislative
aim in imposing the sanction. The court asserted that a determination of
whether Congress sought primarily to punish violators or to regulate and
clean up oil spills was significant. Legislative intent was analyzed by refer-
ence to the plain language of the statute, and by an examination of the en-
forcement mechanism established by the Coast Guard pursuant to the
statute. A punitive intent was indicated by the fact that the penalty was
assessed automatically; that the amount of the penalty was determined by a
consideration of the size of the business, the effect of the penalty on the own-
er or operator's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the viola-
tion17 further evidenced a punitive intent. The court of appeals believed
that these statutory factors bore no relation to the government's purported
goal of maintaining an adequate clean-up fund. A violator's removal efforts
and expenses could not be considered in fixing the amount of the penalty.
Furthermore, under Coast Guard order, intentional discharges, and those
discharges resulting from gross negligence, were to result in the most severe
penalties.' 8 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this statu-
tory and administrative enforcement scheme lacked any semblance of regu-
latory or remedial intent. 19
The court of appeals confirmed this conclusion by examining the stat-
ute in light of an often used, but erratically applied test, set forth by the
Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marlzez.20 The test requires the appli-
cation of seven "indicators of congressional intent" to a statute as a means of
determining whether the statute is criminal (punitive) or civil (regulatory) in
nature.2 ' The court declared that application of the Mndoza-Marttnez in-
13. Id.
14. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
15. 100 S. Ct. at 2640.
16. 598 F.2d at 1194. See Overview, Lands and Natural Resources, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 293, 297-99 (1980).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6).
18. United States Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 5922.1 IA (Feb. 23, 1973).
19. 598 F.2d at 1190-92.
20. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
21. A sanction may be deemed punitive if it: (1) involves an affirmative disability or re-
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dicators to section 311 (b) (6) of the FWPCA revealed a punitive intent. The
section 311 (b) (6) factors used to determine the amount of the penalty indi-
cated the presence of a scienter requirement. The court emphasized that a
party could act in good faith and undertake clean-up measures, yet that
party would still be penalized for even an unavoidable discharge. The ap-
pellate court felt that these facts indicated that the statute promoted the
traditional aims of punishment; namely, retribution and deterrence. The
court also noted that the behavior to which the statute applied was already a
crime under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.22
Whereas the legislative aim in adopting the section 311 (b) (6) sanction
was to punish, rather than to regulate, a water polluter, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the sanction actually imposed a criminal penalty
for the discharge of oil and hazardous substances into navigable waters. The
court therefore declared that information obtained through the statutorily
required notification procedure could not be used by the government to de-
termine liability for violations of section 311 (b)(3). The court of appeals
added that self-reported information could not be used in the calculation of
the amount of a violator's penalty under section 311 (b) (6). The Tenth Cir-
cuit court declared that evidence to establish the existence of an illegal dis-
charge had to be derived from an independent source.
23
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, over-
ruled the court of appeals' decision without fully addressing many of the
issues raised by the lower court. The Court's inquiry as to whether the statu-
tory penalty was criminal in nature proceeded in two stages. Justice Rehn-
quist looked for either an express or an implied congressional preference for
a civil or criminal penalty. The labelling of the sanction as a "civil penalty,"
in juxtaposition with the criminal penalties set forth in the immediately pre-
ceding subparagraph,2 4 was considered by the Court as a sufficient indica-
tion of a congressional intent to impose a civil sanction.
2 5
The Court's second level of analysis focused on whether the statutory
scheme was so punitive in nature, either in purpose or effect, as to negate the
legislature's express intention. In searching for a punitive effect, the Court
failed to assess the section 311 (b) (6) factors considered by the government in
determining the amount of the penalty.2 6 Justice Rehnquist also failed to
set forth his assessment of the Mendoza-Martihez criteria.2 7 The criteria were
straint, (2) has historically been regarded as punishment, (3) comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, (4) promotes the traditional aims of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence,
(5) applies to behavior which is already a crime, (6) may rationally be connected to an alterna-
tive purpose, or (7) is excessive in relation to its alternative assigned purpose. 372 U.S. at 168-
69.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
23. 598 F.2d at 1194.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
25. 100 S. Ct. at 2641.
26. See text accompanying note 17 supra. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, agreed with
the Tenth Circuit's opinion that the failure to calculate penalties on the basis of the govern-
ment's actual clean-up costs indicated a lack of remedial intent. Justice Stevens noted that, in
light of the Mendoza-Martinez criteria, the section 311 (b)(6) factors indicated a legislative intent
to create a criminal sanction. 100 S. Ct. at 2646-47.
27. The majority acknowledged that the behavior to which the sanction applied is already
19811
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believed to be "neither exhaustive nor conclusive on the issue," and therefore
were "in no way sufficient to render unconstitutional the congressional clas-
sification of the penalty established in section 311 (b)(6) as civil." 2 8 Based on
this limited examination, the Court found no punitive effect which might
render the sanction criminal.
Respondent Ward's alternative claim, that the sanction was "quasi-
criminal," and therefore sufficient to invoke the protection of the fifth
amendment, was also rejected. Ward attempted to draw support for this
claim from Boydv. United States.2 9 In the Boyd case, the Court had held that
forfeiture proceedings, held as a result of a violation of a revenue statute,
were sufficiently criminal in nature for the purpose of the fifth amendment.
The majority found Boyd, and other similar cases, readily distinguishable on
the basis that the penalty involved in those cases was not related to damage
sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law. The FWPCA pen-
alty involved in the Ward case was considered more analogous to traditional
civil damages.30 Weight was again given to the existence of separate statu-
tory criminal remedies to punish similar activities.
3 1
As the penalty imposed on discharges of oil and hazardous substances
was neither criminal nor "quasi-criminal" in nature, Ward's fifth amend-
ment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination did not relieve him of
the duty to comply with the statutory notification procedure. A violator's
own report of an illegal discharge, which is required by law, can be used as a
means of determining liability for the violation, and the facts contained in
the report may be used to determine the amount of the violator's penalty.
Dan Scheid
B. Andrus v. Utah
In Andrus v. Utah,32 the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Utah v. Kleppe33 wherein the Tenth Circuit
court had held that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended, 34 did
not empower the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to classify land as eligi-
ble for indemnity selection pursuant to the school indemnification selection
statutes. The court of appeals had ruled that the selection of school indem-
a crime (the fifth indicator), but considered the point to be of little significance. Justice Black-
mun, in a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, applied the Mendoza-Martnez factors
and found that they indicated a remedial intent. 100 S. Ct. at 2644-45.
28. 100 S. Ct. at 2642.
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. No explanation was offered as to why the money penalty involved in the Ward case is
"much more analogous" to a civil penalty than to a criminal fine.
31. 100 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
32. 100 S. Ct. 1803 (1980).
33. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion, see
Overview, Landr and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Circuit Surve, 56 DEN. L.J. 517-23
(1979).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976).
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nity lands was to be based on equal acreage-not equal value-with the lost
base lands.
Between 1965 and 1971, the State of Utah exercised its right, granted
under the Utah Enabling Act of 189435 and the federal school indemnifica-
tion statutes,36 to select indemnity lands in lieu of original school land grants
which Utah never received due to federal preemption or private entry prior
to survey. Utah selected 194 parcels of land, embracing approximately
157,255.9 acres, all of which were located within federal grazing districts
created under the Taylor Grazing Act. The selections included extremely
valuable oil shale lands while the original land grants were of significantly
lesser mineral value. Utah filed its selection lists with the Secretary for ap-
proval, but the Secretary responded that he would not approve any indem-
nity applications that involved "grossly disparate values."'3 7 The Secretary
added that although the land values of the lost base lands and the indemnity
lands had not been precisely determined, it appeared that they involved
grossly disparate values as judged by departmental guidelines. 38 The State
of Utah filed suit in the federal district court seeking injunctive relief. The
state sought a court order directing the Secretary to approve or disapprove
Utah's indemnity selections by December 15, 1976. The district court
granted Utah's motion for summary judgment, and the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed.39
The controversy in this statutory construction case turned upon
whether the 1936 amendment 40 to section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act or
sections 851 and 852 of the federal statutes governing state land grants
4'
controlled the disposition of school indemnity lands. As amended, section 7
authorizes the Secretary to compare the selected lands with the original
school land grants on an equal value basis and to refuse the exchange if the
selected lands are grossly higher in value than the original grants. Section
851, on the other hand, specifically states that whenever a state does not
receive its allotted school land grant due to federal preemption or private
entry, then the state is entitled to "other lands of equal acreage" selected in
accordance with the provisions of section 852.42 Section 852 provides, in
part, that lands "mineral in character" cannot be selected as in lieu lands
unless the lost base lands were also "mineral in character.
43
The Tenth Circuit court reasoned that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing
Act, as amended, was not applicable to school indemnity lands as neither the
Act, nor its legislative history, evidenced an intent that section 7 was to ap-
35. Ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107.
36. 43 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (1976).
37. 100 S. Ct. at 1805.
38. Department of Interior guidelines provided that the grossly disparate value policy
would only be applied in cases where the estimated value of the selected lands exceeded that of
the base lands by the greater of $100 per acre or 25%. Id. at 1805 n.3.
39. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978).
40. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 842, § 7, 49 Stat. 1976 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976)).
41. 43 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (1976).
42. Id. § 851 (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 852(a)(1).
1981]
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ply to selected school lands.44 Rather, after examining the legislative history
and the express language of sections 851 and 852, the court of appeals found
that school indemnity lands were governed by sections 851 and 852.4 5 Con-
sequently, the court of appeals concluded that once it was determined that
both the original grants and the indemnity lands were mineral in character,
the indemnity lands were to be selected on an equal acreage basis and not on
the equal value basis mandated by section 7.46 The court of appeals viewed
the Secretary's function as ministerial, requiring that he approve indemnity
applications upon a showing of compliance with sections 851 and 852.
4 7
Reversing the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended, confers broad discre-
tion on the Secretary to classify lands within a federal grazing district as
eligible for school indemnity selection and that the grossly disparate value
policy was a lawful exercise of the Secretary's discretion when applied to
school indemnity lands.48 Thus, under the Court's view, the correct stan-
dard for school indemnity lands is the equal value principle-not the equal
acreage principle.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, capsulized the majority opin-
ion by stating that the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
had misinterpreted the congressional policy underlying the provision for in-
demnity selection and had misconstrued section 7 of the Taylor Grazing
Act.49 Justice Stevens emphasized that the history of the general statutes
elating to school indemnity grants repeatedly demonstrated that the pur-
pose of these statutes was to provide the states with lands roughly equivalent
to the lost original lands.50 No evidence suggested that Congress intended
the states to select lands of substantially greater value than the original
grants. 5' Rather, the entire history of these statutes evidenced a congres-
sional intent only to make the western states whole for the forfeited original
grants.
52
The Court further reasoned that the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended,
and Executive Order 691053 had the effect of withdrawing all unappropri-
ated federal lands in the western states from entry or selection pending sub-
sequent congressional or presidential action except, at the Secretary's
discretion, for the purposes specified in section 7.54 Consequently, indem-
nity lands were only available as permitted by the Secretary in the exercise
of his discretion under section 7. Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that
44. 586 F.2d at 767.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 760-61.
48. 100 S. Ct. at ,1813.
49. Id. at 1806.
50. Id. at 1807.
51. Id. at 1808.
52. Id.
53. Executive Order 6910, issued by President Roosevelt in 1934, withdrew all unappropri-
ated and unreserved public lands in twelve western states from all forms of entry and selection
pending further determination of the best use of the land. 54 Interior Dec. 539 (1934).
54. 100 S. Ct. at 1813.
[Vol. 58:2
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the grossly disparate value policy employed by the Secretary was wholly con-
sistent with the congressional intent underlying indemnity selections of giv-
ing the states a rough equivalent of the lost school grants. 55
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Rehnquist, raised a vigorous dissent. Justice Powell perceived the
majority opinion as resting on three fundamental misconceptions: 1) that
the states had no right to equal acreage since the indemnity lands were given
as compensation to the states; 2) that the creation of grazing districts under
the Taylor Grazing Act had the same effect as a withdrawal of lands under
the Pickett Act;56 and 3) that the Secretary had authority under the Taylor
Grazing Act to reject indemnity selections by applying standards which were
inconsistent with the standards enunciated in the indemnity selection stat-
utes.
5 7
Justice Powell noted that the majority's first misconception could not
stand in light of the long line of statutes dating from the early 1800's which
demonstrated that Congress specifically adopted an equal acreage standard
to compensate the states for the lost base lands.5 8 Justice Powell viewed the
majority's second misconception as displayinj a serious misunderstanding of
the history of federal land management and the language of the Taylor
Grazing Act. 59 Moreover, Justice Powell stated that withdrawals under the
Pickett Act of 191060 had the effect of halting entry on and selection of pub-
lic lands pending further determination of the best use of the land. 6 1 Since
Taylor Grazing Act lands were exempted from Executive Order 691062 by
Executive Order 7274,63 such lands were limited solely by the Taylor Graz-
ing Act which allowed entry or selection upon classification of the land by
the Secretary. 64 The majority's third misconception also could not stand,
reasoned Justice Powell, as section 165 of the Taylor Grazing Act exempts
school grant indemnity rights from' the Act.66 Furthermore, even if indem-
nity rights are not exempted from the Act, section 7 does not authorize the
Secretary to apply the equal value standard when the school indemnification
statutes specify that the proper standard is the equal acreage standard.
6 7
In concluding his dissent, Justice Powell implied that the application of
the equal value standard rather than the equal acreage standard results in a
55. Id. at 1813-14.
56. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847. The Pickett Act was repealed by the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, tit. VII, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792.
57. 100 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1815.
59. Id. at 1814.
60. Set note 56 supra.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 1820.
62. See note 53 supra. Executive Order 6910 was a Pickett Act withdrawal. 100 S. Ct. at
1819-20.
63. Executive Order 7274, which was issued two years after Executive Order 6910, ex-
cluded all grazing district lands from the operation of Executive Order 6910. 100 S. Ct. at 1820.
64. 100 S. Ct. at 1820 & n.21.
65. Section 1, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976), specifies that the Act shall not affect "any
land . . . which . . . [otherwise] would be a part of any grant to any State ....
66. 100 S. Ct. at 1821.
67. Id. at 1822.
19811
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breach of the covenant that the United States made with Utah upon Utah's
admission to the Union.68 Consequently, Justice Powell stated that he
would have upheld the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' affirmance of the




II. SUPREME COURT AFFIRMANCES*
Andrus v. Glover Construction Co.
In Andrus v. Glover Construction Co. ,70 the Supreme Court affirmed a 1979
Tenth Circuit decision wherein the court of appeals had held that a federal
highway construction contract could not be awarded to an Indian construc-
tion company without the government first publicly advertising for bids.
7 1
In March 1976, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
issued a memorandum interpreting the Buy-Indian Act, 72 said memoran-
dum providing that bidding on contracts with the BIA was restricted to In-
dian owned companies; non-Indian owned companies were allowed to bid
only if Indian owned companies were not available. In an attempt to com-
ply with the Commissioner's directive, the BIA invited three Indian owned
construction companies to bid on a contract for the reconstruction of a five-
mile segment of road in an area within the jurisdiction of the BIA. The
contract was awarded to Indian Nations Construction Company, an Indian
owned enterprise, in May, 1977. No public advertising occurred in relation
to the bidding. Glover Construction Company, a non-Indian contracting
operation, brought suit, alleging that the Federal Property and Administra-
tive Services Act of 1949 (FPASA) requires public advertising for such
bids.73 The district court found that the contract was invalid, and that the
government should be enjoined from entering into any future road contracts
without complying first with the public advertising requirements of the
FPASA.
74
In affirming the district court's holding, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected the government's claim that the Buy-Indian Act was an excep-
68. Id. at 1823.
69. Id.
70. 100 S. Ct. 1905 (1980).
71. Glover Construction Co. v: Andrus, 591 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1979).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1976). The Act, in relevant part, provides that "(slo far as may be
practicable Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products of Indian industry
may be made in open market." Id.
73. 41 U.S.C. §§ 252-253 (1976).
74. Glover Construction Co. v. Andrus, 541 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
* Two other decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals were affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court during the 1980 term. These decisions, Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), and Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980), are discussed in
case comments within this Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey.
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tion "otherwise authorized by law" under the FPASA, 75 thus rendering
public advertising unnecessary. In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit
Court relied upon rules of statutory construction and upon legislative history
indicating a congressional intent to exclude highway construction projects
from the operation of the Buy-Indian Act.
76
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
77
Using the same rules of statutory construction as were employed by the court
of appeals, the High Court concluded that the Buy-Indian Act was an excep-
tion "otherwise authorized by law," but found it questionable whether a
road constructed or repaired by an Indian owned company was "a product
of Indian industry" as contemplated by the Act. 78 The Court continued,
stating that even if the road were a product of Indian industry, a second
provision of the FPASA relating to road construction contracts 79 evinced a
congressional intent to bar the negotiation of such contracts under the au-
thority of laws like the Buy-Indian Act. Thus, the Court held that the
FPASA required public advertising before such a road construction contract
was entered.80
Chrtintte Cooke Parker
75. The FPASA provides a broad exception to the advertising requirement:
All purchases and contracts for property and services shall be made by advertising, as
provided in section 253 of this title, except that such purchases and contracts may be
negotiated by the agency head without advertising if otherwise authorized by law
41 U.S.C. § 252(c)(15) (1976).
76. 591 F.2d at 560-61.
77. 100 S. Ct. at 1911.
78. Id. at 1910.
79. 41 U.S.C. § 252(e) (1976).
80. 100 S. Ct. at 1911.
1981]
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III. DENIALS OF CERTIORARI
A. Cases from Fifth
Annual Survey* Tenth Circuit Citation Certiorari Denied
United States v. Clayborne 584 F.2d 346 (1978) 444 U.S. 847 (1979) (sub
nom. Bruneau v.
United States)
United States v. Heath 580 F.2d 1011 (1978) 439 U.S. 1075 (1979)
(sub nom. Babb v.
United States)
United States v. Mireles 583 F.2d 1115 (1978) 439 U.S. 936
B. Cases from Sixth
Annual Survey Tenth Circuit Citation Certiorari Denied
Century Laminating, Ltd. v. 595 F.2d 563 (1979) 444 U.S. 987 (1979)
Montgomery
Coleman v. Darden
Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp.
Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp.
Marshall v. Sun Oil Co.
Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Adjustment Bureau,
Inc.
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Mar-
shall
United States v. Askew
United States v. Barron
United States v. Bowers
United States v. Brown
United States v. Davidson
United States v. Erb
United States v. Kilburn
United States v. Leavitt
United States v. New Mexico
United States v. Priest
United States v. Roberts
United States v. Smaldone
United States v. Smyer
United States v. Watson
United Telecommunications,
Inc. v. Commissioner
595 F.2d 533 (1979)
593 F.2d 969 (1979)
592 F.2d 1118 (1979)
592 F.2d 563 (1979)
597 F.2d 1318 (1979)
591 F.2d 612 (1979)
584 F.2d 960 (1978)
594 F.2d 1345 (1979)
593 F.2d 376 (1979)
600 F.2d 248 (1979)
597 F.2d 230 (1979)
596 F.2d 412 (1979)
596 F.2d 928 (1979)
599 F.2d 355 (1979)
590 F.2d 323 (1978)
594 F.2d 1383 (1979)
583 F.2d 1173 (1978)
583 F.2d 1129 (1978)
596 F.2d 939 (1979)
594 F.2d 1330 (1979)
589 F.2d 1383 (1978)
(cert. d mirsed)
444 U.S. 927 (1979)
444 U.S. 838 (1979)
444 U.S. 856 (1979)
444 U.S. 826 (1979)
444 U.S. 929 (1979)
444 U.S. 828 (1979)
439 U.S. 1132 (1979)
441 U.S. 951 (1979)
444 U.S. 852 (1979)
441 U.S. 917 (1979)
444 U.S. 861 (1979)
444 U.S. 848 (1979)
440 U.S. 966 (1979)
444 U.S. 833 (1979)
444 U.S. 832 (1979)
444 U.S. 847 (1979)
439 U.S. 1080 (1979)
439 U.S. 1073 (1979)
(sub nom. La Rocco v.
United States) and
439 U.S. 1119 (1979)
(sub nom. Foderaro v.
United States)
444 U.S. 843 (1979)
444 U.S. 840 (1979) (sub
nom. Brown v. Unit-
ed States)
442 U.S. 917 (1979)
* Additional cases from the Fifth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, for which certiorari has been
denied, appear at 57 DEN. L.J. 344 (1979).
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